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Reproduced by (he . and are therefore reluctant to make them. But If a mediator suggests that a concession be made, and if he seems reasonable and fair as a person, a negotiator can rationalize a concession by telling himself that he Is not being weak but rather Intelligent to follow the lead of a worthy consultant.
In a sense, the mediator helps him save face with himself.
These ideas provide a basis for speculating about the conditions under which mediation wilt be most effective in producing concessions. A mediator's suggestions should have the greatest impact when the negotiator to whom they are presented is most In conf I let between a need 1© make concessions and a need to appear adequate or strong.
.
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In such a conflict, the negotiator will feel free to make the concessions he would like to make only if the mediator's suggestions relieve him of concern about appearing inadequate or weak. Both needs are presumably present to some degree at all times in nego+iation. Hence strengthening either need should intensify the conflict between them and thereby heighten the effectiveness of mediation. 
A need to make concessions can be produced by time pressures (Prultt and
Drews
METHOD

Subjects
The subjects used in the study were male undergraduate students from the State University of New York at Buffalo. Of the 104 that were run, 4 were eliminated because they came as a group and were all close personal friends and 4 were dropped because they made offers that were of negative value to themselves in the pre Intervent Ion period (to be explained later).
Of the remaining 96, 64 were run during the summer session and were recruited from various courses with a promise of remuneration of at least $2.00 "and possibly more" for their participation. The other 32 were drawn from an introductory psychology course during the fall semester.
They were promised the same remuneration and. In addition, their participation satisfied a course requirement.
Physical Layout
The experimental room contained four booths along one wall. The subjects sat facing the back of a booth so that they could not see anyone
In the room. Ten feet In front of the row of booths was a table, at which the recorder-mediator sat. This table was protected by a 12" barrier which prevented detection of the recorder's activities in case a subject turned around.
Task and Procedure
Each session Involved four subjects and a confederate wrto was Introduced as another subject. At the beginning of the session, a supposedly random procedure was employed to determine which one of the participants was to be the "recorder." This was biased so that the
, confederate always received this role. The four subjects always received the role of "negotiator." Instructions were then presented for handling the task. The subjects were told that they would be divided into two pairs, each consisting of a buyer and a seller, who would bargain with each other without knowing one another's identity. They were to act as if they were bargainers in a wholesale market, but no specific commodity was mentioned.
A hypothetical example was presented with the aid of a blackboard, showing a list of prices and the profits for the buyer and seller associated with each price. The experimenter pointed out in this example that a rone existed in which both buyer and seller could make a profit but that there was no price at which both of them could make the same profit. Questions were answered, and the subjects were then seated in the booths.
Although the subjects had been told that two of them would be buyers and two would be sellers, a notice in the booth informed every subject that he was a buyer. The booth also contained the following I Ist of prices and profits.
Price Profit 
The mechanics of the task were described as follows: (2) The time-pressure variable was manipulated at the point of intervention. In ^ hi nK .. m p. 0 r esS ure CHTE1 condition, the subjects were told that they had very 1ittle time left to reach agreement. A loudly ticking timer was set in motion with the understanding that a bell would soon ring to end the negotiation. In the jow time pre ?S u.re UJEI condition, they were told that they had plenty of time left to reach agreement, and the timer was not set in motion. In neither case were the subjects told exactly how much time remained.
(3) The mediator variable was manipulated immediately following the announcement about time pressure. In the fflediauoa condition, the subject received a note from the recorder suggesting that he reach agreement at a specific price. This price was always half-way between the subject's last offer and $7.00 (the program's last offer). The note was worded as follows:
On the basis of my predictions, I would suggest that you agree on a price of • A copy of this note has also been sent to your opponent.
,n the nn-.nediatlon condition, no suggestion was ever received from the recorder.
The 96 subjects were rendcnly distributed over the 8 cells of this design, 12 per cell. As e further control, 2 out of the 4 subjects in w^ggrrr^rrr.
each session were assigned to the mediator condition and 2 to the no-mediator condition.
'•i
?33sstaassaamBrsi*.'pt'r***r'
i HI <l »I'll 1 ' i M ■ssss *l-^»r; -, -.,;-,, .' . iC-).*,. , -!f,.tmnv::r~j-:
10
RESULTS
Behavior before Intervention
The period before Intervention affords an opportunity for studying reactions to the other negotiator's concessions. Figure I Table 3 and an analysis of variance In Table 4 . The size of this Index closely parallels the extent to which people actually made concessions, as shown In Table I l«i."JJi"-»JtH -,-;, :r:; s" , v ,,.," r: ■: H ,; ,;.* .;.;:.;f;f-^ u^ ■.,-*-«I i-' 
Means and standard deviations of this Index are shown in
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